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PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Henry G. McMahon*
JURISDICTION

In Personam
The extent to which the personal jurisdiction of Louisiana
courts over foreign corporations has been broadened in recent
years is indicated clearly in Covington v. Southern Specialty
Sales Co.1 There, a lawnmower service man and his employer's
compensation carrier sued for damages for personal injuries
sustained by the former from a defective starter rope on a mower on which he was working. The manufacturers of both the
mower and its engine, which were foreign corporations not
licensed to do business in this state, were joined as defendants
with the Louisiana distributor of both mowers and engines.
Process was served on the foreign corporations through the
Secretary of State under the recently-amended statute authorizing such service on a foreign corporation which is not required
to obtain a license to do business here in a suit on a cause of
2
action resulting from a business activity in this state.
The trial court sustained the foreign corporations' exceptions to the service of process and to the jurisdiction of the
court in personam. After an extended analysis of the evidence,
and a detailed review of recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the volume of Louisiana
business done by each through interstate commerce constituted
sufficient contacts with this state so that "the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' -3 Both sold a large volume of their products
through a Louisiana distributor and more than a hundred and
*Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 158 So. 2d 79 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
2. LA. R.S. 13:3471(1) (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 1.
3. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
See also
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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forty sales outlets and service centers in this state. These 0ales
in Louisiana were fostered and stimulated through regular and
periodic visits to this state by the corporations' out-of-state sales
4
agents.
The plaintiff in Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co.5 sued for damages for physical injuries which he sustained when his own vehicle overturned in Avoyelles Parish
while being driven by his nephew, an unemancipated minor.
Suit was filed against both plaintiff's insurer and the named
defendant - the insurer of the minor's father, a resident of
Arkansas. In the trial court, the named defendant successfully
excepted to the court's jurisdiction in personam over it, contending that even though it was licensed to do business in Louisiana the policy sued on was issued in Arkansas. This decision
was properly reversed by the Court of Appeal for the Third
Circuit. As the named defendant was licensed to do business in
Louisiana and the accident happened here, it was held subject to
the personal jurisdiction of the trial court. The appellate court
refused to consider the issue of whether the named defendant
was liable under the policy sued on, holding that this was a matter which should be determined by the court below on the trial
of the case on its merits.
Since 1960 Louisiana has conferred on its courts the full potential of jurisdiction in personam over foreign corporations now
permitted by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
However, this legislation grants jurisdiction only with respect
to Louisiana causes of action.6 This was overlooked by one trial
court, which overruled an exception to its jurisdiction in personam filed by a Pennsylvania railroad corporation sued here
on a non-Louisiana cause of action. 7 The defendant did no intrastate business whatsoever in Louisiana, but merely maintained
an agent in New Orleans for the solicitation of freight and passenger business for its lines outside of the state, on whom process had been served. Under its supervisory jurisdiction, the
4. Under its facts, this suit could also be brought now under LA. R.S.
13:3201(d) (1950), added by La. Acts 1964, No. 47, § 3. This new statute is
discussed in Louisiana Legislation of 1964- Civil Procedure, 25 LA. L. REV. 28
(1964).

5. 158 So. 2d 413 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
6. See the statutes cited and analyzed in Louisiana Legislation of 1964--Civil
Procedure, 25 LA. L. REV. 28, 28-32 (1964).
7. Universal Carloading & Distributing Co. v. Sala Motor Freight Line, 156
So. 2d 608 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding the
service of process invalid and the trial court to have no personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. This appellate court decision is
completely sound. Not only has Louisiana not attempted to confer on its courts personal jurisdiction over nonresidents on nonLouisiana causes of action, but it is doubtful whether it could
constitutionally do so.8
VENUE

Walker v. Associated Press9 was a libel suit filed in Caddo
Parish. The petition alleged that the named defendant was the
author of a libelous news item printed in the morning and afternoon newspapers published by the other defendant, a New Orleans publisher, which had been circulated in Caddo Parish. The
trial court maintained the defendant's exceptions to the venue
and transferred the suit to the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. 10 Under its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court
of Appeal for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the
case for trial in Caddo Parish. The appellate court recognized
the fact that both defendants could have been sued in Orleans
Parish," but pointed out that as the suit was one arising ex delicto, the New Orleans publisher could be sued in Caddo Parish
where its newspapers were circulated and the damage was
done,'12 and its co-tortfeasor could be joined in the same suit.1 3
Insofar as the damages sustained by the plaintiff in Caddo
Parish are concerned, there can be little doubt of the validity
of the appellate court's decision. However, the court went beyond this in holding that the venue was proper for the recovery
of all damages which plaintiff had sustained, within and without
Caddo Parish. This result is certainly a desirable one, as it
8. Cf. Simon v. Southern Ry., 316 U.S. 115 (1915).
9. 162 So. 2d 437 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
10. Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 932 (1960).
11. Under id. art. 42(2, 5).
12. "An action for the recovery of damages for an offense or quasi offense
may be brought in the parish where the wrongful conduct occurred, or in the
parish where the damages were sustained ....
" Id. art. 74.
13. The appellate court upheld the venue as to the Associated Press on the
ground that "An action against joint or solidary obligors may be brought in any
parish where such action may be maintained against either." 162 So. 2d at 440.
This is much too broadly stated. The pertinent code provision reads: "An action
against joint or solidary obligors may be brought in any parish of proper venue,
under article 42, as to any obligor who is made a defendant." LA. CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE art. 73 (1960).
However, this is of no moment here, as the venue
was proper as to Associated since the damages caused by its wrongful act were
sustained in Caddo Parish. See id. art. 74, the pertinent language of which is
quoted in note 12 supra.
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would not only protect the defendants from harassment but also
relieve the courts of the burden of multiple litigation on the
same subject. However, the validity of this latter holding does
not appear to be free from doubt. It appears to the writer that
the only basis for the Caddo Parish venue was the publisher's
wrongful act in circulating its newspapers with the libelous
article in that parish. Additional damage was sustained by the
plaintiff in other parishes, and throughout the country, but none
of this additional damage was sustained in Caddo Parish, and
the publisher's wrongful acts which caused this additional dam4
age were not committed in Caddo Parish.1
The plaintiff in Hancock v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 15 under
an allegation that she was domiciled in Terrebonne Parish,
brought suit in that parish to recover workmen's compensation
benefits. The defendant employer was a domestic corporation
which had its registered office in Caddo Parish; the defendant
compensation carrier was a foreign corporation licensed to do
business in this state; and the accidental injury was sustained
in De Soto Parish. During the trial of the case, information
elicited from plaintiff disclosed that she was a domiciliary of
Texas. Thereupon, defendants excepted to the jurisdiction of
the court over subject matter. The trial court sustained the exception and transferred the case to the district court of De Soto
Parish. 16 The Court of Appeal for the First Circuit reversed. It
properly held that the defendants' objection was actually one of
improper venue, which had been waived by the filing of their
17
answer.
PARTIES

Indispensable Parties
The facts of Mays v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.' 8 are much
too involved to capsule them into the space available. For present purposes this suit may be regarded as one for damages
brought against the insurer of a hospital on allegations of the
negligence of a physician employed by the hospital. In the trial
14. CI. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 462(1) and 463(2)

15.
16.
17.
18.

155 So. 2d 47 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 932 (1960).
See id. arts. 925(4) and 928.
159 So. 2d 388 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).

(1960).
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court this defendant moved for and obtained a summary judgment dismissing the suit. Its motion was supported by proof
that a partnership relation obtained between the physician and
the hospital, and on the contention that this partnership was an
indispensable party to any suit to establish any liability of the
hospital for the physician's wrongful act.' 9 The Court of Appeal
for the Second Circuit sustained this position of the insurer, but
remanded the case to the trial court to permit the joinder of the
partnership. In a commendably liberal opinion, Judge Ayres,
the organ of the appellate court, held that while the pleading
employed was designated as a motion for summary judgment
its function was that of an exception pleading the nonjoinder of
an indispensable party, 20 and the procedural rules governing the
latter would be applied. 21 The writer predicts that this decision
will be invoked as a precedent frequently in the future. 22
Whenever a rank interloper attempts to assert judicially the
right of a third person, there is always a nonjoinder of an indispensable party. However, the more direct and precise approach to this type of problem is to regard the interloper-plaintiff as having no right of action or justiciable interest in the
controversy. In one decision of the past term,23 one appellate
court took the long way home. It held that a judgment against
the plaintiff, who sued to enforce a right of an existing partnership of which he was a partner, should be reversed because of
24
the absence of an indispensable party.
19. "The partners of an existing partnership may not be sued on a partnership obligation unless the partnership is joined as a defendant." Id. art. 737.
20. "Pleadings are taken for what they really are, and not for what their

authors designate them." Mays v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 159 So. 2d 388,
389 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
21. Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 646 (1960), amendment should
always be allowed to permit the joinder of an indispensable party.

22. Considerable doubt exists as to whether a plaintiff may be permitted to
amend when his suit is dismissed on a summary judgment. See B-W Acceptance
Corp. v. Clarkson, 154 So. 2d 67, 69 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963). The Mays case
may be used as a precedent to permit amendment when a motion for summary
judgment is used to perform the function of an exception. The point is discussed
further, p. 439 infra.

23. Foster v. Stewart, 161 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
24. This case has a collateral point of some interest. The judgment in favor
of the defendant on his reconventional demand was also reversed because of his
failure to sue the real debtor, the partnership; but the case was remanded to
permit the joinder under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1064 (1960). This
article has broadened the reconventional demand by providing that "when the
presence of parties other than those to the principal action is required for the
granting of complete relief in the determination of a reconventional demand, the
court shall order the plaintiff in reconvention to make such parties defendants in
reconvention, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained."
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Substitution of Parties
25
In the only case decided in this area during the past term,
the appellate court rendered a Marbury v. Madison type of decision. The trial court rendered a judgment adverse to the joint
plaintiffs, but one of these died prior to the signing of the judgment. In the motion for an appeal, the widow and children of
the deceased attempted to substitute themselves as parties plaintiff. When the transcript was lodged in the appellate court, the
appellee moved to dismiss the apeal. This motion was granted
without prejudice by the appellate court, which pointed out in a
per curiam opinion that the judgment against the deceased was
a nullity, and a valid judgment could be signed by the court below only after the widow and children of the deceased had been
26
substituted as parties plaintiff.

PLEADING
Exceptions
27
The distinction between the functions of the objections of
no right, and of no cause, of action, never material except when
evidence is sought to be adduced on the trial of the exception,
came up for its annual re-examination in Georgia Pacific Corp.
v. B. G. M. Builders.25 There, plaintiff sought to enforce a materialman's privilege against property owned by the defendant.
After the latter had excepted to the petition because of its failure to allege the service of a sworn detailed statement of the
claim on the defendant, plaintiff amended to include this allegation expressly. Defendant then excepted to the petition as
amended on the ground that it disclosed no right of action, as no
sworn detailed statement of the claim had actually been served
on defendant. On the trial of this exception, and over plaintiff's
objection, defendant proved that only a duplicate original of the
privilege affidavit had been served on him, and the trial court

25. Fountain v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 161 So. 2d 120 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1964).
26. Either voluntarily by the widow and children under LA. CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE art. 801 (1960), as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 92, § 1, or compulsorily by the defendant under id. arts. 802-804.
27. The new procedural Code recognizes only three exceptions -the
declinatory exception; the dilatory exception; and the peremptory exception. The
nominate exceptions of the prior law are now reduced to the role of objections
to be pleaded through one or more of the three exceptions. See id. arts. 922;
925-927, and Introduction to Title I of Book II.
28. 154 So. 2d 78 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeal for the First
Circuit distinguished the functions of the twin objections; held
that only the objection of no cause of action could raise the defense pleaded; and ruled that evidence should not have been admitted on the trial of the exception to contradict the allegations
of the amended petition. There appears to be no doubt of the
validity of the appellate court's decision. The only questions
about the case which this writer cannot answer are what did
the plaintiff gain from his successful appeal, and why did the
defendant not use the motion for summary judgment instead of
the exception?
State v. Thoman 29 presented a rather interesting question
concerning res judicata. Originally, a mortgagor had brought
a mandamus proceeding against the mortgagee to have the inscription of recordation of the mortgage cancelled on the ground
that the mortgage note had prescribed. The trial court rendered
judgment making the alternative mandamus peremptory, and
the mortgagee appealed. While this appeal was pending, the
mortgagee died and his widow and universal legatee was substituted as appellant; and, under an agreement between the widow
and the mortgagor, the mortgage indebtedness was paid through
services rendered by the mortgagor for the succession. The
mortgagor, however, did not plead payment in the appellate
court or ask for a remand to prove it. After argument, the appellate court reversed the judgment in the mandamus proceeding and recognized the continued validity of the mortgage.
Thereafter, the property was seized in the judicial enforcement
of the mortgage, and the mortgagor sued to annul the judgment
of the appellate court and to enjoin the enforcement of the mortgage. The trial court sustained the widow's exception and held
that as a result of his failure to plead payment prior to the decision of the appellate court the mortgagor was precluded from
pleading it later. The Court of Appeal for the First Circuit reversed. It held that while the mortgagor might have pleaded
payment prior to its decision he was not bound to do so and was
free to plead it in the annulment proceeding.
Motion for Summary Judgment
The decisions of the appellate courts during the past term
indicate that this new procedural device is being used to a con29. 154 So. 2d 480 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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siderable extent, both properly and improperly. In three of
these cases, the appellate courts reversed summary judgments
on appeal when genuine issues of material fact were found.8
In one of these, Shird v. Maricle,3 1 plaintiff sued his immediate
employer, a subcontractor, and the latter's principal contractor,
for compensation for injuries received. The principal was engaged in the business of removing stumps and delivering them
to a nearby manufacturing plant, and had subcontracted a portion of this work to the plaintiff's immediate employer. Plaintiff was injured while returning to his home after working all
day in the repair of his immediate employer's truck. The trial
court granted a summary judgment rejecting plaintiff's demand
against the principal on the theory that the repair of trucks was
no part of the principal's business, trade, or occupation. After
pointing out that the repair of equipment is usually considered
as a part of a contractor's business, the Court of Appeal for the
Third Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that mover's
supporting affidavits for the summary judgment did not negative the possibility that the repair of trucks was a part of the
principal's business, and that this was a genuine issue of fact.
Summary judgments were reversed by the appellate courts
in two cases where this procedural device had been leveled at
the failure of the petitions to state a cause of action.3 2 At first
blush, the writer was inclined to think that possibly this may
have been too technical a position for the courts to take; but
further reflection (as well as a review of the cases in which
motions for summary judgments have been made) leads him to
believe now that these cases are completely sound. The function
of the motion for summary judgment is to dispose summarily
of well pleaded but frivolous demands or defenses; while that
of the peremptory exception, inter alia, is to dispose of cases
where the petition fails to state a cause of action. When the exception is sustained, plaintiff has an absolute privilege of
amendment, if possible;33 but there is considerable doubt
whether a trial court may permit amendment after it grants a
summary judgment.3 4 Further, there is some evidence of a
30. Shird v. Maricle, 156 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) ; Joseph v.
Greater New Guide Baptist Church, 159 So. 2d 556 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964)
and Richie v. Chaudoir, 163 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
31. 156 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
32. B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Clarkson, 154 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963) and Perry v. Reliance Ins. Co., 157 So. 2d 903 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
33. Under LA. CODE OF CIVI PROCEDURE art. 934 (1960).
34. See cases cited note 32 8supra.
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tendency to plead objections which should be raised through
the peremptory exception as grounds for the motion for summary judgment. 85 Unless curbed, this practice will not only subject a plaintiff to some prejudice but it is bound to muddy the
waters.
In two cases, the appellate courts held that testimonial proof
may not be introduced at the hearing of the motion for a summary judgment. In one, the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit reversed a summary judgment granted on mover's testimony at the hearing in support of his motion.86 In the other,
the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit affirmed a summary
judgment granted after the trial court had refused to permit the
37
.adverse party to testify in opposition to the motion.
Ahten v. Citizens Homestead Ass'n,88 illustrates the effective
use of this procedural device. This was a suit to recover damages for the faulty construction of a new residence brought
against the contractor and the homestead association through
whom the construction had been financed. Pending trial, plaintiff compromised his claim against the contractor. The homestead association then moved for summary judgment rejecting
plaintiff's demand against it, which was granted by the trial
court and affirmed on appeal. The Court of Appeal for the
Fourth Circuit held that since the named defendant was only
secondarily liable, and if cast had the right to obtain indemnity
from the contractor, the homestead association was released
from any liability when plaintiff's compromise deprived it of its
subrogatory right to indemnity.
Answer
Two cases during the past term involved the pleading of affirmative defenses. In Louisiana Mach. Co. v. Passman,89 defendant had been adjudicated a bankrupt before, but had received his discharge in bankruptcy after, the filing of suit
against him and rendition of judgment by default. In the present action the assignee of the judgment creditor sought to revive the default judgment, and in opposition defendant pleaded
s 35. See cases cited note 32 supra and Mays v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co.,
159 So. 2d 388 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), discussed p. 436 supra.
Wilkinson v. Husser, 154 So. 2d 490 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
S3.
37. Boothe v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 161 So. 2d 293 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
38. 163 So. 2d 403 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
39. 158 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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the nullity of the judgment due to his subsequent discharge in
bankruptcy. The trial court refused to revive the judgment, and
the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit affirmed on appeal.
Both courts properly rejected plaintiff's contention that defendant's failure to plead affirmatively his adjudication in bankruptcy prior to judgment precluded his subsequent reliance on
the discharge. Both held that nothing required defendant to
plead his adjudication, and that he might plead his subsequent
discharge in bankruptcy whenever the judgment was sought to
40
be enforced against him.
The defendant failed to plead affirmatively the illegality of
the consideration for the note sued on in Davis-DelcambreMotors v. Simon.41 However, on the trial of the case evidence was
admitted without objection proving that the consideration for
the note sued on was plaintiff's threat to have defendant's employee jailed for issuing worthless checks and its forbearance
in not prosecuting him. On appeal, the Court of Appeal for the
Third Circuit reversed the trial court's judgment for plaintiff.
The appellate court held that the answer had been enlarged by
the evidence admitted without objection, 42 and this evidence
proved the illegality of the consideration for the note.
The only noteworthy feature of Johnson v. Walgreen Louisiana Co. 43 is the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit's holding that the pendency of a motion to strike extends automatically the delay allowed for answering and precludes a valid default
44
judgment. On this point, the appellate court said:
"While this subject is not specifically dealt with in
Code of Civil Procedure, the reason is no doubt due to
fact that it was considered obvious that a default could
be taken while any preliminary objection to a petition

the
the
not
re-

40. This position is completely supported by the pertinent language of LA.

art. 1005 (1960) which requires, in part, that "The
answer shall set forth affirmatively . . . discharge in bankruptcy," and nowhere
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

requires the affirmative pleading of the adjudication in bankruptcy.

41. 154 So. 2d 775 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), reversed on the merits by the
Supreme Court. Id., 246 La. 105, 163 So. 2d 553 (1964).
42. "When issuies not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised by the pleading. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary
to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues... " LA. CoE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1154 (1960).
43. 163 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
44. Id. at 832.
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mained undecided. If the plaintiff considered the motion
to strike an improper dilatory tactic and the time allowed
for hearing on it too long, his recourse was to the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court and not to enter a preliminary default."
In view of the extreme care taken by the Louisiana State
Law Institute to preclude dilatory defensive tactics, the suggestion that the Institute intended to open the floodgates to such
tactics in the form of defensive motions is, to say the least, quite
surprising. The short and simple answer is that the Institute
did expressly consider the matter. Article 1001 of the new procedural Code provides:
"A defendant shall file his answer within fifteen days
after service of citation upon him, except as otherwise provided by law.
"When an exception is filed prior to answer and is overruled or referred to the merits, or is sustained and an amendment of the petition ordered, the answer shall be filed within ten days after the exception is overruled or referred to the
merits, or ten days after service of the amended petition.
"The court may grant additional time for answering."
(Emphasis added.)
Since the declinatory and dilatory exceptions must be filed
45
at the same time, and then only prior to answer or default,
any "stringing out" of the exceptions is precluded. No provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, or of any special statute,
expressly provides that the delay for answering is automatically
extended when a defensive motion has been filed. The reason
for this is obvious. There are at least three nominate defensive
motions, 46 and an infinite number of innominate ones, and any
such rule would have provided a potential for dilatory defensive
tactices never before dreamed of in Louisiana.
When a defendant files one of these defensive motions prior
to exception or answer, he should also move for an extension of
time for answering, and thus submit to the trial court the de45.

LA. CODM OF CIVIL PROCEDRUE

art. 928 (1960).

* 46. The motion to strike (id. art. 964) ; the motion for judgment on the pleadings- (id. art. 965) ; and the motion for summary judgment (id. art. 966).
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termination of whether such an extension would be :in the interest of justice.
Johnson v. Walgreen Louisiana Co. is an unfortunate decision which should be overruled at the very first opportunity.
Third Party Demand
The use of this procedural device to enforce contribution between joint tortfeasors was clarified by three cases decided during the past term.
In Cuccia v. PrattFarnsworth,Inc.,47 the trial court rejected
the third party demands of two of the original defendants
against the third on the ground that the third party petitions
disclosed no cause of action. The basis of this decision was that
the prayers of the third party petitions were for the same
amount might be rendered against the third party plaintiffs,
instead of for the third party defendant's portion of this amount.
This defective prayer enabled the third party defendant to argue
successfully in the trial court that the third party demands
sought to enforce indemnity in a case where the law did not
allow it. The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit reversed
on appeal. The appellate court held that, as the third party petitions charged the third party defendant with the same acts of
negligence charged by plaintiff, the third party demands sought
to enforce contribution against the third party defendant as a
joint tortfeasor. The prayer of the third party petitions for the
full amount of any judgment which might be rendered against
the third party plaintiffs was held to be founded on an erroneous
conclusion of law which did not bind the third party plaintiffs.
Emmons v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 48 decided by the Court of

Appeal for the Fourth Circuit during the 1962-1963 term, and
criticized by the writer in a prior issue of this Review, 9 was
reversed by the Supreme Court under a writ of review. 0 The
Supreme Court held that a defendant could enforce contribution
47. 155 So. 2d 41 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
48. 150 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
49. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1963
Term-Civil Procedure, 24 LA. L. REV. 291, 307, 308 (1964).
50. Emmons v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 245 La. 411, 158 So. 2d 594 (1963).
This Supreme Court decision accords with Vidrine v. Simoneaux, 145 So. 2d 400
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). See also Fussell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 153 So. 2d 911, 912 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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against his co-defendant without the necessity of filing a third
party demand against him.
Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co.51 is probably the most important procedural decision of the past term. There, plaintiff sued
two alleged joint tortfeasors and their respective insurers for
damages for physical injury. Prior to trial, plaintiff compromised with one of the alleged tortfeasors and his insurer with
full reservation of his rights against the other defendants, and
the suit was dismissed as to the released defendants. The other
defendants then called the released defendants back into the
suit as third party defendants to enforce contribution against
them, in the event the third party plaintiffs were cast. The
released defendants excepted to the third party petition on the
ground that it disclosed no right or cause of action, and also
moved for summary judgment rejecting the third party demand.
After trial of the exception and motion, and proof of the compromise, the trial court rendered summary judgment rejecting
the third party demand. On appeal, this judgment was affirmed
by the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit. The appellate
court held that, by compromising with the third party defendants, plaintiff had released them from liability, hence the third
party plaintiffs had no subrogatory right to enforce contribution. The appellate court was careful to point out, however, that
the third party plaintiffs had not been prejudiced by the compromise; and that, if the third party plaintiffs could prove on
the trial that the negligence of the released insured had contributed proximately to the accident, any judgment against the
third party plaintiffs would be limited to half of the damages
which the plaintiff had sustained.
The opinion in the Harvey case is so clear and convincing
that it should settle finally all professional doubts concerning
the effect of a compromise with one of two or more joint tortfeasors.
APPEALS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Right to Appeal
The result reached by the Court of Appeal for the Fourth
Circuit in Succession of Menendez52 is unquestionably correct.
51. 163 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
52. 155 So. 2d 212 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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That decision held that one who unsuccessfully opposed the
"provisional account" of a succession representative had a right
to appeal from the judgment which homologated it. However,
there is language in the opinion of the appellate court that runs
directly in the teeth of the code rule that a "judgment homologating any account other than a final account [in a succession
proceeding] shall be prima facie evidence of the correctness of
the account." 53 In support of its position in this respect, the
appellate court relied on a number of cases, not a single one of
which involved the homologation of a provisional account in a
succession proceeding. 54 The result reached by the appellate
court would have been correct even if the appeal had been from
a judgment homologating a provisional account, since this judgment resulted in a prima facie presumption of the correctness
of the account.5 5 However, what the appellate court there termed
a "provisional account" was actually a "provisional tableau of
distribution."5 6 The new procedural Code expressly permits an
appeal from a judgment homologating a tableau of distribution,5 7 so the result reached is correct. The decision is noted
here in the effort to prevent its loose language and erroneous
statement of the law from being invoked as precedent in the
future.
53. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3337 (1960). This rule is based on
the provisions of LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1191 and 1674 (1870), which were repealed by La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 2.
54. Succession of Nock, 239 La. 593, 119 So. 2d 476 (1960) involved the
final account of the succession representative. Dowling v. Canal Bank & Trust
Co., 216 La. 372, 43 So. 2d 763 (1949) and Liquidation of Canal Bank & Trust
Co., 211 La. 803, 30 So. 2d 841 (1947) concerned provisional accounts in the
liquidation of a bank. In re Phoenix Building & Homestead Ass'n, 203 La. 565,
14 So. 2d 447 (1943) involved the provisional account of the liquidator of a
building and loan association. Woodward-Wight & Co. v. National Box Co., 168
La. 701, 123 So. 296 (1929) concerned the provisional account of a receiver.
The procedure in these types of judicial liquidations is quite different from
that used in the administration of successions.
55. Compare Succession of Lissa, 194 La. 328, 193 So. 663 (1940), where
an heir not mentioned in an ex parte judgment of possession in a succession
proceeding was permitted to appeal therefrom because of the prima facie presumption of correctness of the recitals in the judgment appealed from.
56. See Succession of Menendez, 160 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964),
where the appellate court reversed the judgment homologating the "provisional
tableau of distribution."
There is a vast difference between the tableau of distribution and the account
in a succession proceeding. On this point compare LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
arts. 3303-3308 (1960) with id. arts. 3331-3338; and see id. Preliminary Statement to Chapter 7 of Title III of Book VI.
57. Id. art. 3308.
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Appellate Procedure

In Fussell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 58 the
procedure sanctioned by the appellate court is confused and, in
one respect, erroneous. There, husband and wife sued to recover damages suffered by the wife and medical expenses paid
by the husband, resulting from an accident sustained while
plaintiffs were riding in an automobile owned by them, but
driven at the time by their daughter. Named defendants were:
(1) the driver of a truck traveling in the same direction as
plaintiffs' vehicle, who was alleged to have negligently attempted a left turn without proper warning; (2) the insurer
of this truck; (3) the driver of an automobile traveling in an
opposite direction, and its insurer; and (4) the insurer of plaintiffs' vehicle. The suit against the insurer of the truck was
dismissed on motion for summary judgment. After trial, judgment was rendered for plaintiffs against the truck driver, and
the suit was dismissed for the remaining defendants. The truck
driver appealed and plaintiffs answered the appeal, praying for
an increase of the judgment against appellant and also for
a solidary judgment against all defendants. The non-appealing
defendants moved to dismiss the appeal "on the ground [p] laintiffs took no appeal from the judgment dismissing movers from
the suit and the appeal taken by the co-defendant ... does not
bring before this Court his alleged in solido co-defendants." 59
The appellate court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal,
reviewed the plaintiffs' case against all defendants, and affirmed the judgment appealed from on the facts.
The action of the appellate court in holding that the defendant's appeal brought up for review the judgment dismissing the suit for all other defendants,6 0 and in denying the motion to dismiss, were correct. However, its action in reviewing
plaintiffs' case against the non-appealing appellees was improper. What the appellate court overlooked was the fact that
defendant's appeal brought up for review the judgment dismissing the case for the other defendants only insofar as the
appellant was concerned; and it erred in construing article
2133 of the new procedural Code as permitting the modifica58. 153 So. 2d 911 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
59. Id. at 912.
60. Emmons v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 245 La. 411, 158 So. 2d 594 (1963),
reversing 150 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; and Vidrine v. Simoneaux,
145 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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tion of a judgment as between appellees through an answer to
the appeal. 61
The decision of the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit
in Howard v. Insurance Co. of North America,62 flatly contrary
to Fussell on this point, places the proper interpretation on the
pertinent code article in accordance with the settled jurisprudence.
The decisions of both appellate courts concerned in Portier
v. Marquette Cas. Co. 3 accord with the tenor and spirit of the
new procedural Code. There, the defendant had appealed suspensively from a judgment against it for the damage to an
automobile. Due to the delay in the preparation of the transcript of testimony, the return day was thrice extended by the
trial court, the last time to August 20, 1962. During this time,
with the single exception noted, counsel for the appellant
promptly paid to the clerk of the trial court all fee bills presented to him, and three times requested to be advised of the
return day, as he expected to be out of town for some little time
during the summer. Finally, on August 10th the clerk requested
a check to cover the filing fee of the appellate court; but, as
counsel for appellant was then out of town, a check to cover
was not forwarded until August 29th. The record of appeal
was filed in the appellate court on September 5th, sixteen days
after the extended return day, and appellee immediately moved
to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the record had not been
filed timely.6
The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit, after a consideration of the pertinent facts, denied the motion to dismiss
and held that the delay had been attributable to the clerk of
the trial court and not to the appellant. It found that counsel
for appellant had deposited with the clerk of the trial court
sums more than ample to cover all costs of appeal, but that the
clerk had improperly charged against these deposits the costs
61. See Comment (c) to LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2087 (1960),
as amended by Acts 1962, No. 92, § 1.
62. 159 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
63. 245 La. 702, 160 So. 2d 585 (1964), affirming 150 So. 2d 882 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963).
64. Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 2126 and 2127 (1960), the
clerk of the trial court has the duty to file the record of appeal in the appellate
court, provided the appellant pays him all costs of appeal three days prior to the
return day, or extended return day.
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of the trial court, despite the fact that a suspensive appeal from
the judgment had been taken. On the merits, the intermediate
appellate court reversed the judgment appealed from. 5 Under
a writ of review limited to the motion to dismiss the appeal,
the Supreme Court affirmed the intermediate appellate court's
68
denial of the motion.
SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION

Only one case worthy of note was decided in this area during the past term, but that decision presented a novel question.
In Reiley v. Atlas Construction Co.,6 7 the Courts of Appeal for
the First and Second Circuits jointly attempted to certify to
the Supreme Court certain questions presented to each of them
in separate applications for supervisory writs in connected
litigation. The Supreme Court held that it was without authority to consider and answer the questions propounded to it
by the intermediate appellate courts. The application for supervisory writs filed in each of those courts was held not to be
a "cause" pending before them, and the question of whether
they should grant the supervisory relief prayed for was not a
"question of law," within the intendment of the applicable constitutional provision. 68
EXECUTORY PROCEEDINGS
After the enforcement via executiva, of a mortgage affecting
immovables, the plaintiff in Gumina,v. Dupas 9 obtained a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor by default. When the
judgment creditor attempted to enforce this judgment against
him, the mortgagor sued to annul it and to enjoin its enforcement, on the ground that the mortgaged property had been sold
in the executory proceeding without appraisement. 70 The judgment creditor excepted to the petition in the nullity action on
the ground that it disclosed no right or cause of action, as the
65. Portier v. Marquette Cas. Co., 150 So. 2d 882 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
66. Id., 245 La. 702, 160 So. 2d 585 (1964).
67. 244 La. 949, 155 So. 2d 29 (1963).
68. LA CONST. art. VII, § 25.
69. 159 So. 2d 377 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
70. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2723 (1960) requires appraisal of the
mortgaged property prior to its sale in an executory proceeding, unless appraisement has been waived in the act of mortgage. Id. art. 2771, and LA. R.S. 13:4106
and 13:4107 (1950) bar a deficiency judgment, unless the property was appraised
prior to sale.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

nullity asserted should have been urged as a defense in the
personal action prior to judgment. The trial court maintained
the exception and dismissed the suit for nullity. On appeal, the
Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit reversed, and remanded
the case for further proceedings. The code and statutory bar
against a deficiency judgment when the mortgaged property
was sold without appraisal was held to be a prohibitory law, and
any judgment rendered in violation of it would be null.
After the enforcement via executiva of a chattel mortgage, and
the sale of the mortgaged property after appraisal, the mortgagee in Tapp v. Guaranty Finance Co. 71 obtained a deficiency
judgment against the mortgagor by default. Three years later,
the assignee of this judgment sought its enforcement through
the garnishment of the wages of the judgment debtor. The latter
then sought to annul the judgment against him, and to enjoin
its enforcement, on the ground that the writ of seizure and sale
in the executory proceeding had issued without sufficient authentic evidence. The trial court dismissed the action of nullity,
and the judgment creditor appealed. The Court of Appeal for
the First Circuit reversed. It held that, as the original seizure
and sale had been made without sufficient authentic evidence,
all subsequent proceedings were null; and that this nullity could
be asserted three years after rendition of the deficiency judgment.
The writer believes that this decision, and the cases on which
it is based, are unsound and pose a serious threat to the future
usefulness of executory process. As he is in complete agreement with a recent critique of the Tapp case,72 which reviews
the code provisions and jurisprudence on the subject, he will
content himself here with this critical reference to the case.
THE PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Attachment
In Chas. A. Kaufman Co. v. Gregory,73 plaintiff sought to
recover about $75,000 which it alleged that the defendant, a
71. 158 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963), noted 24 LA. L. REV. 894
(1964).
72. See Note, 24 LA. L. REV. 894 (1964).
73. 244 La. 766, 154 So. 2d 392 (1963), rever8ing 145 So. 2d 119 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962).
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former employee, had embezzled from it over a period of years.
A writ of attachment issued on the grounds that defendant was
about to dispose of his property with intent to defraud his
creditors, and had converted, or was about to convert, his property into money with intent to place it beyond the reach of his
creditors. Defendant moved to dissolve the attachment, averring
the falsity of the grounds alleged. On the trial of the motion to
dissolve, defendant offered evidence tending to refute the alleged grounds for the issuance -of the attachment. Plaintiff
then attempted to prove, through the testimony of its officers,
that defendant had embezzled $75,000 from it over a period of
years, and stated that this evidence would be offered solely
for the purpose of proving the grounds for the issuance of the
attachment. On objection of the defendant, the testimony tendered was excluded as being the same evidence that plaintiff
would rely on to establish its case on the merits. Thereafter,
the trial court dissolved the attachment. On appeal, this judgment was affirmed by the intermediate appellate court. 74 Under
a writ of review, the Supreme Court reversed, and remanded
the case with instructions to the trial court to permit the introduction of the excluded evidence.
The Supreme Court pointed out that prior to 1961 the burden
was upon a defendant who sought to dissolve an attachment
on motion to prove the falsity of the grounds on which it had
been issued; but this burden of proof had been shifted by the
new procedural Code which now imposed the onus of proving
the grounds for the issuance of the attachment on the plaintiff. 75 The excluded evidence was held material to the grounds
alleged by plaintiff for the issuance of the writ.
The more important of the two cases on this subject decided
76
during the past term is American Steel Building Co. v. Brezner.
Plaintiff sued a contractor and the surety on his faithful performance bond for $46,000 due for materials supplied for a
public construction job. An attachment was issued, and under
it garnishment process issued to seize the balances due the con74. Chas. A. Kaufman Co. v. Gregory, 145 So. 2d 119 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962).
75. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3506 (1960) provides: "The defendant by contradictory motion may obtain the dissolution of a writ of attachment . . . , unless the plaintiff proves the grounds upon which the writ was
issued. ....

"

76. 158 So. 2d 623 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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tractor on two other construction jobs. As grounds for the
issuance of the writ of attachment, plaintiff alleged that the
contractor had assigned the balances due under the other contracts to other creditors, with intent to defraud his creditors,
or to give an unfair preference to some of them.7" On motion
of the contractor, the attachment was dissolved, and mover was
awarded damages for its illegal issuance. On appeal, this judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit.
The appellate court held that the first ground for the issuance of the attachment required proof of a specific intent of
the debtor to defraud his creditors, and found no proof to this
effect in the record. The second ground - unfair preference was held to be a constructive fraud as defined by the pertinent
Civil Code articles, 78 for example, where the creditor knows
that the debtor is in insolvent circumstances and the transaction
gives the creditor any advantage over other creditors. 79 The
appellate court reviewed and analyzed the prior jurisprudence
holding that, to constitute an unfair preference, the complaining
creditor must be actually prejudiced by the transfer made or
security furnished by the debtor. It then pointed out that, since
the attaching creditor had timely and properly recorded its
privilege for the materials furnished and was adequately secured
by the faithful performance bond, the assignments of the defendant did not give his assignees any unfair preference.
Sequestration
Of the three cases on this subject decided during the past
term,80 only Reiley v. Atlas Construction Co. 81 requires extended
consideration. The confusing ramifications of that controversy
make any focus upon a particular point difficult. For present
purposes, it suffices to note that, after an intermediate appellate
.77.

These are specified as grounds for the attachment by LA. CODE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE art. 3541(2) (1960).
78. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1983 and 1984 (1870).
79. Cf. id. art. 1984.
80. The other two decisions are not of any particular importance. Ralph's
Fleet v. American Marine Corp., 157 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) merely
involved the quantum of damages to be awarded the defendant on the dissolution
of a Writ of sequestration. In Time Finance Co. v. Johnson, 161 So. 2d 392
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial'
court dissolving the writ of sequestration for failure of the plaintiff to file the
sequestration bond timely.
81. 245 La. 595, 159 So. 2d 688 (1964).
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court had reduced a judgment for plaintiff to $25,000,82 the
defendants ruled her into the trial court to fix costs and either
to reduce the judgment by half, or to reduce it by $7,500, the
amount which plaintiff had previously received in compromise
from the surety of a joint tortfeasor. Plaintiff excepted to the
latter portions of this petition on the ground they disclosed no
cause of action and were concluded by the prior judgment. After
these exceptions had been overruled, plaintiff had the judgment
made executory in the district court for East Baton Rouge
Parish, and under a writ of fieri facias garnished certain securities belonging to the defendant insurer in the hands of the
Secretary of State. The defendant insurer then deposited the
amount of the judgment and costs with the sheriff, and the
garnishment was released. Thereafter, under a writ of sequestration issued by the original trial court, the coroner of East
Baton Rouge Parish sequestered a sufficient portion of the
funds in the hands of the sheriff of that parish to cover the
claim of the defendants for a reduction of the judgment. Plaintiff then successfully moved in the East Baton Rouge Parish
court to dissolve the sequestration, and the Court of Appeal for
the First Circuit refused to issue supervisory writs to set aside
8
the judgment dissolving the sequestration.
Under its supervisory jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the East Baton Rouge Parish court
dissolving the sequestration. As the funds attempted to be
sequestered were in custodia legis at the time, in the hands of
the sheriff under authority of a writ issued by his court, no
other court had jurisdiction over these funds. Justice Summers, the organ of the majority of the court, held that defendants' remedy was a suit for injunction in East Baton Rouge
Parish to prevent the sheriff of that parish from paying the full
amount of the judgment to the plaintiff.
Justice Hawthorne dissented strongly. He pointed out that
the rule of comity applied by the majority of the Justices of
82. See Reiley v. Atlas Constr. Co., 146 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
See also id., 146 So. 2d 211 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) and Dacey v. Same, 146 So.
2d 218 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
83. While the application for supervisory writs was pending in the Court of
Appeal for the First Circuit, plaintiff applied for a writ of prohibition from the
Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit to prevent any further proceedings in
the original trial court. Both of these Courts of Appeal then jointly attempted
to certify the issues involved to the Supreme Court, but the latter refused to
consider the matter. This segment of the controversy is discussed p. 449 supra.
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the Supreme Court was used only to prevent "a conflict over
the possession of property, which would be unseemly and subversive of justice, '8 4 and should never be employed in a manner
which might create injustice. As he saw the case, the only thing
which the defendants were attempting to do was to prove partial payment of the judgment by a joint tortfeasor. Justice
Hamlin concurred in this dissent.
This is an extremely close decision. Perhaps the idealism
of the law professor accounts for the stamp of approval which
the writer places on the dissent.
SEPARATION FROM BED AND BOARD

The defendant husband, in Walker v. Walker,8 5 when sued
by his wife for a separation from bed and board, pleaded the
prior dissolution of the marriage by a judgment of divorce rendered by an Arkansas court. This divorce decree had been
rendered by the Arkansas court without personal service of
process on the wife. After the trial of the separation proceeding, the Louisiana district court found that a bona fide change
of domicile had been made by the husband to Arkansas, and
that hence the divorce decree rendered in that state was entitled to full faith and credit. Accordingly, judgment was rendered, inter alia, rejecting the wife's demand for a separation
from bed and board and for permanent alimony for herself:
The wife suspensively appealed to the Court of Appeal for the
Third Circuit, which affirmed those portions of the judgment
8s
just mentioned.
The appellate court's recognition of the Arkansas divorce
decree left, as the most interesting feature of the case, the wife's
right to recover permanent alimony from the husband. The
facts of the case indicated convincingly that the wife had not
been free of fault, so the appellate court resolved the issue
84. 245 La. at 614, 159 So. 2d at 694.
85. 157 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
86. The majority of the court further held that, as the judgment of the trial
court refusing to grant the wife permanent alimony was suspended by a timely
motion for a new trial and by a timely suspensive appeal, the liability of the
husband for. the payment of alimony pendente lite to the wife continued until
the decree of the appellate court became final. Judge Tate, in his concurrence
in the denial of a rehearing, expressed the view that, while the motion for a
new trial and suspensive appeal required the husband to continue these payments,
after affirmance he had the right to recover all such payments made subsequent
to the rendition of a final judgment by the trial court.
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against her on this ground. Had the wife been free of fault, a
hiatus in the substantive law of Louisiana would have presented
the court with a serious question as to its authority to grant her
permanent alimony.
Following this decision, the appellate court called this hiatus
in our law to the attention of the Louisiana State Law Institute.
On the recommendation of the latter, the legislature in 1964
amended the Civil Code so as to grant a court the right to award
alimony to a wife free from fault when the "husband obtained
a valid divorce from his wife in a court of another state or
87
country which had no jurisdiction over her person.1

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO LAWFUL ARREST

State v. Pickens1 provides a clear exposition of the rules
governing the scope of the officer's search for weapons and
incriminating evidence incidental to an arrest on reasonable
suspicion that the arrestee has committed a felony. 2 In Pickens
the Supreme Court upheld the search of an automobile in which
burglary suspects were driving at the time of their arrest shortly after the crime. Thus, the stolen money and goods found
were lawfully seized and were properly admissible in evidence
at the subsequent burglary trial. Justice Hamlin stressed the
fact that "in the case of moving vehicles whose drivers may
be carrying contraband or stolen property, and flight and escape
are imminent, probable cause can exist for search without a
warrant, time being of the essence. If the vehicle or automobile
were not searched, apprehension of the criminal would be unnecessarily delayed and perhaps never take place."'3 Upon an examination of the facts and circumstances of the case, it was
87. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 160(3) (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1964, No. 48,
This amendment is discussed in Louisiana Legislation of 1964 Civil Procedure, 25 LA. L. REV. 28, 32 (1964).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 245 La. 680, 160 So. 2d 577 (1964).
2. LA. R.S. 15:68 (1950).
3. 160 So. 2d at 584.
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